This paper explores the implications of the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the Doha Round agriculture negotiations for the right to food in the Global South. It tracks the contribution of civil society in pushing the food rights paradigm following agriculture's entry into multilateral trade agreements in 1995. It analyzes how the AoA imposes "free trade" on the poor, while supporting market protection in developed countries. The paper follows developing countries' efforts to advance their food security interests in negotiations, and how "divide and rule" tactics shifted overarching human rights concerns towards a focus on technical details.
INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO)'s Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was presented as a significant first step towards structural change in global food markets, which would strengthen Global South food security through free trade. In 2003 the World Bank estimated the current Doha Round (DR) of negotiations on agriculture to be worth up to US$ 350 billion for the Global South by 2015. 1 While liberalization of agricultural trade, especially in the Global North, could bring important benefits to the Global South, the AoA imposes a one-sided free trade model on poor countries, while rich countries continue to heavily subsidize their agricultural sector. These policies undermine the right to food in the Global South, with agriculture comprising 65 percent of employment, and 29 percent of GDP in agriculture-based economies. 2 The implications of the UR AoA on the right to food has led to a deadlock in the current DR negotiations with developing countries, supported by a world-wide food rights campaign, demanding change to the AoA structure. This paper examines the dynamics of the negotiations, analyzes the various proposals from different Global South coalitions and explores the implications of draft modalities for the right to food in the Global South. It is argued that the AoA undermines the right to food because it does not recognize the obligation of the State to respect, protect and fulfill this right as enshrined in international law.
The paper begins by examining the right to food and its relationship to alternate concepts of food rights. It then analyzes the UR AoA rules and their impacts on the right to food in the Global South. Next it explores how the Global South has addressed the right to food in the DR negotiations and briefly highlights the role of the civil society food rights campaign in defending the right to food. The paper ends with an analysis of the implications for the Global South of the current draft text for a DR AoA.
THE RIGHT TO FOOD
The right to food is covered in various human rights conventions. It comprises a right of availability and access to food, embodying the principles of sustainability (ongoing supply) and utilisation (adequate nutrition for a person's metabolic requirements) (see Table, page 9). Despite existing in international law for some thirty years, it was the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) that acted as a catalyst for the UN system to further clarify and monitor the right to food, highlighting it as hard law, rather than an aspirational goal. 3 In 2000 the UN established a Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food [hereinafter Special Rapporteur] , followed by the FAO's 2004 Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food. 4 In 2009 the introduction of an Optional Protocol for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) saw progression towards an international mechanism for addressing right to food violations. 5 Unlike other definitions of food security, the right to food contains human rights obligations for States. These obligations safeguard existing entitlements by ensuring the State does not prevent access to food (respect), protects individuals from enterprises or individuals who may deprive them of such access (protect), and works to strengthen people's entitlements to food (fulfill -facilitate) and if necessary provide that food (fulfil -provide). 6 The right to food is a progressive right -it is not expected the State can guarantee this right absolutely, but that it progress towards this end goal, working against any regressions of this right. 7 In meeting their right to food obligations States must equally consider short, mid and long-term needs. Of the WTO's 153 Members,8 127 have ratified the ICESCR overseeing the right to food. Alternate understandings of food rights and obligations intersect or exist parallel to the right to food, and such definitions are framed by broader social or economic strategies and objectives. 9 Concepts of food security, entitlement theory and food sovereignty inform the right to food to the extent that they incorporate or oppose its principles. Food security is the terminology most prevalent today in food debates. Emerging in the 1960s, food security equated food production self-sufficiency with national security and rights to self-determination. 10 It reflected concerns of the impacts of imported food aid on domestic production, escalating with the mid-1970s global food crisis, 11 and acknowledged the contribution of agriculture in developing economies. 12 In the 1980s national food security strategies shifted from predominantly food production "selfsufficiency" to include "self-reliance" -securing a food supply through self-production and trade. 13 Stringer charts a significant expansion of the food security literature during the 1990s, with marketorientated economic growth becoming "the sine qua non for …improving food security." 14 Most food security definitions encompass the dimensions of enough food for an active healthy life; access to this food; and the guarantee of access at any given time, without articulating clear obligations for States or others to guarantee this right. 15 In 1981, Amartya Sen injected the human rights perspective into food analysis through his seminal study of four decades of famine. He concluded that starvation occurred "...not from people being deprived of things to which they are entitled, but from people not being entitled...to adequate means for survival." 16 Entitlement theory presented comprehensive evidence to situate food access within a broader human rights framework, particularly economic, social and cultural rights. Sen observed that during famine sufficient food often was, or could be made available, but people lacked production-, trade-, labor-or transfer-based entitlements to produce or obtain food by legal means. Fifteen years later, a coalition of civil society organizations (CSOs), particularly La Via Campesina, launched the concept of food sovereignty, at the NGO/CSO forum running parallel to the 1996 WFS. 17 As a concept food sovereignty is still emerging, although generally it describes the right of States or communities to autonomously determine their own food policy -thereby providing the State with the autonomy to meet its right to food obligations. 18 It can also entail a particular vision. The CSO coalition and peasant movement advocate for an alternative to the productivist agricultural development model, 19 incorporating non-capital intensive forms of agriculture and agrarian reform. 20 Alternatively, a "protectionist" vision does not challenge current agricultural practices, but may share an emphasis on local food production and decentralization. National food sovereignty policies have been adopted by WTO member Least Developed Countries (LDC) such as Senegal and Mali and explored by the Special Rapporteur.
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In contrast to rights-based analysis, neo-classical economics argues that the free market is best equipped to address food concerns. 22 Based on the theory of comparative advantage and factor endowment, free trade proponents contend that trade liberalization will provide food security through increased economic growth (strengthening people's entitlements to food), removing production disincentives and distortions (ensuring adequate food production) and reducing supply variability (through access to a more diverse food supply in world markets). 23 This perspective opposes government intervention to address food concerns because such intervention compromises the market's capacity to ensure food security. 24 States can best serve their citizens by restructuring the global trade system, prioritizing the mid-and long-term gains of free trade over the short-term hardship of transition as a country re-directs resources to develop its comparative advantage. The WTO's AoA embraces the free trade approach, with the stated long-term objective is "to provide for substantial progressive reductions on agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets." 25 The assumption behind this objective is that the market can and will address problems of food security. The AoA has profound, far-reaching and multi-faceted implications for the Global South. These implications have led to an intense and bitterly divisive North-South debate on the roles and responsibilities of the state in a globalizing era.
The UR negotiations concluded with recognition that the AoA maintained imperfections but claimed to lay the foundations for greater free trade in subsequent negotiations. The following section analyzes the UR AoA rules and their implications for the right to food in the Global South. 
THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE (AoA) AND THE RIGHT TO FOOD
The WTO makes some mention of food security, although the AoA contains no reference to the right to food. The implications of the UR AoA for food security, particularly in the transition period of global structural reform of food markets, were recognized as a non-trade concern (NTC) to be reviewed in the next negotiating round (Doha). "Special and differential treatment" (S&D) -where developing countries and LDCs were allowed longer implementation periods and some exemptions on reform commitments -was also a mechanism to indirectly safeguard food security. Despite various references to food security, the WTO gives no clear definition of this term. Responses included helping to fulfil -provide by providing food aid and fulfil -facilitate through short-term financing of commercial imports; agricultural export credits; and financial assistance to improve agricultural infrastructure and production. It did not address other scenarios where the AoA would impact food availability and access, and did not take measures to respect and protect the right to food in low-food producing countries. Its creation fits a particular interpretation of free trade where net gains for those who "win" under this system are considered large enough to compensate those who "lose". The imperative for "winners" to compensate "losers" is that even after providing compensation their net gains are greater than operating outside of perfect free trade. 27 In this theory vulnerable States do not directly respect, protect and fulfil the right to food, but hope to secure transfer-based entitlements from other States or entities, such as Corporate Social Responsibility Programs, UN agencies and NGOs. Despite world food price spikes in 1996, and the 2007-2008 food price crisis, the Marrakesh Decision has never been enacted because developed countries argue that there is insufficient proof of causality between the AoA and food insecurity.
While in theory the AoA is based on the free trade model, in practice free trade is imposed on poorer countries but rich countries continue to protect their agricultural sectors.
28 OECD countries subsidize their domestic agricultural production by approximately US$ 1 billion a day. This has serious implications for the right to food in the Global South.
The Rules of the AoA and Implications for the Right to Food in the Global South
The rules of the AoA are based on three pillars: domestic support, export competition and market access. The following sub-sections examine the implications of the AoA rules under the three pillars for the right to food.
Domestic Support
Under AoA rules, any domestic support which effects or provides price support to producers is considered trade distorting due to its direct link to agricultural production. 29 Rules governing domestic support are classified in three boxes -Amber, Green and Blue. The Amber Box is comprised of "trade-distorting subsidies" and is the only category subject to cuts. Amber Box policies -which include market price support or direct per unit payments to farmers by governments -were to be cut by 20 percent over six years from a 1986-1988 year base period (13.3 percent over ten years for developing countries).
A de minimis provision allows a threshold of permitted distorting support: up to 5 percent of the total value of agricultural production and 5 percent of support for a product (10 percent in both cases in developing countries). Trade-distorting subsidies above the de minimis level are counted in a country's Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). AMS is subject to cuts. The baseline period from when the AMS is required to be reduced , was a time when trade distorting domestic support was historically high, particularly in the EU. 30 Such "rigged rules" were heavily skewed in favor of rich countries, and developing countries were locked out of providing equivalent supports because AMS cannot be increased only reduced and all but twelve developing countries submitted zero AMS. 31 Developed countries further protected much of their domestic support by box-shifting support to the Green and Blue Boxes, which were free from cuts.
The Green Box permitted funding to research and extension services, as well as income payments to producers, provided they were non or minimally trade distorting. The AoA does not define "minimally trade-distorting". Payments could not be directly linked to production output or price support -described as "decoupled" from trade. The Green Box only requires payments be indirectly rather than directly trade distorting. However, as the OECD notes, any transfer to producers which affect their wealth, liquidity or attitude to risk indirectly impacts production, sustaining more farmers than the market can support. 32 Moreover, many policy options provided to developing States under the Green Box are beyond their technical, fiscal and administrative capacity to develop and implement. 33 The Green Box accommodates direct payments and protective measures, most often provided under State-administered social security systems. However, only 20 percent of the global population can access a social security system, common where most people work in the formal sector and pay into a welfare fund. 34 By contrast, where there is a large informal sector and less State capacity to resource or administer a social security system, a social protection system will arise where a set of safeguards or benefits to reduce deprivation are provided through the market, civil society, state or household, or a combination.
The US and other developed countries have used the Green Box to compensate for export subsidy reductions by shifting from direct to indirect subsidies. Export subsidies allow goods to be sold below the cost of production -known as "dumping." Dumping impacts on developing country livelihoods (and therefore entitlements that enable access to food) in two ways: Firstly, developing country producers cannot get a fair export price as they must compete with low priced subsidized products on the world market; Secondly, subsidized products are dumped on the Global South as food aid or sold significantly below the cost of production, leading local producers to lose their livelihoods. Dumping does not guarantee a lower cost to consumers, but can be used strategically to strangle local production through a short-term import surge, ensuring others cannot get a toehold in the market. Many export subsidies are hidden in the Green Box. Between the periods 1986-1988 and 1995-1998, OECD Green Box subsidies more than doubled, 35 with OECD farmers receiving prices 30 percent above world prices in 2001. 36 Products which are indirectly subsidized under the Green Box are often protected from countervailing duties (raised tariffs on an imported product to counter the market distortions of export subsidies).
The Blue Box was a last minute compromise between the EU and US (the key UR negotiators) and permitted trade-distorting payments, provided they were attached to "production limiting programmes." It allowed payments to producers of the difference between the market price and a higher, government issued target price. These price supports violated free trade principles by protecting producers from low-prices, thus sustaining more producers than the market would support. These payments could not be used to expand production, but were limited to fixed area, yields or heads of cattle. The Blue Box allowed the Global North to maintain trade-distorting agricultural surpluses. Furthermore, governments could set target prices as high as they liked, there were no limits on Blue Box expenditure. Also, Blue Box payments that were initially included in a Member's AMS were not extracted when the Blue Box was excused from AMS reductions, so some countries were credited with AMS reductions they never made. 37 The EU, Japan and US are key users of such support.
Export Competition
The rules on export subsidies were based on budgetary outlay and export quantity. Developed countries were to reduce their expenditure on export subsidies by 35 percent and quantities of subsidized exports by 21 percent over six years (24 percent and 14 percent over ten years for developing countries). LDCs were exempt. Reductions were set on a 1986-1990 baseline, when both subsidy outlays and volume were historically high -OECD countries contributing the vast bulk and the EU accounting for over 90 percent of global expenditure on subsidies. 38 Only countries applying export subsidies in 1986-1990 could retain any form of export subsidy. Reductions are based on annual commitments, however a loophole lets countries exceed allowable levels of subsidies, provided that commitments are met cumulatively over a five-year period -judiciously exploited by the US and EU. 39 The extent domestic support reforms supported indirect export subsidies explains the "success" of reductions in the export subsidy pillar, this success predicated on the low bar set for reforms. Cuts to export subsidies were touted as a key success of the UR AoA, however in many cases this was achieved by simply shifting to the indirect export subsidies permitted under the domestic support pillar. The AoA offered few disciplines on food aid to stop the dumping of surpluses, over half of the US's wheat exports going to food aid as the next round of talks began (1999, 2000) . 40 The US also successfully lobbied to exclude government export credit -where foreign banks are extended credit to buy approved donor-country agricultural productsfrom reforms.
41 A "Peace Clause" advocated for by the US and EU, prevented WTO Members from applying countervailing duties to offset dumping until 2004. Agriculture was the only area exempted from the WTO's export subsidy ban, providing time for the US and EU to shift from direct to implicit subsidies. 
Market Access
Central to the UR AoA Market Access Pillar was a process called "tariffication", where countries convert their non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as quotas, to tariff equivalents. This was to allow a simpler, more transparent tariff-based system. The ease of implementing tariffs meant that developing countries had few NTBs. Developed countries were bound to convert their NTBs to an equivalent tariffs rate (taken from the base period of 1986-1990). Developing countries could choose to either undertake tariffication or nominate their own ceiling for tariffs. The base period favored developed countries as a period of peak tariffs. By contrast, in many Global South countries this period saw a dramatic cut in import tariffs and restrictions under Structural Adjustment Program loan conditions. 45 Nominating their own tariff ceiling was therefore attractive to any developing countries with NTBs. The majority of OECD countries, and a few developing countries, converted the value of their NTBs at a rate higher than the equivalent rate, known as dirty tariffication. 46 Members had to bind their tariffs, setting a ceiling on the maximum possible tariff rate. 47 Commitments to reduce tariffs were based on the bound rate, rather than tariffs actually applied. Furthermore, reductions were on average tariffs, based on aggregate tariff lines. This allows developed countries to apply high bound tariffs (tariff peaks or megatariffs) on high-volume imported goods, while undertaking a large percentage cut on already low-tariffs, for low-volume products with little or no domestic production. Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) were incorporated to appease fears that tariffication, in leading to a dramatic tariff increase, would block imports. TRQs set quotas on imports, in-quota imports attracting lower tariff rates, with tariffs defaulting to the higher rate on exceeding the quota. There was no regulation on how Members manage quotas, such as first in policies or import licenses. The EU and US have applied TRQs to set, or maintain, preferential trade agreements despite WTO Members having to provide equal treatment to all Members. (Some such preferential agreements have supported particularly vulnerable developing countries). The use of preferences has also allowed countries to apply high tariffs on goods before quotas are filled.
A Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG) allowed some Members to temporarily increase their tariffs above bound tariff levels. 48 Only countries that undertook tariffication could access the SSG. The SSG was based on a price trigger -enacted as prices fell, or a volume trigger -activated as volumes increased. The volume trigger allowed higher tariffs until the end of the year, while the price trigger applied to an individual shipment. To obtain the SSG Members were required, on implementing the UR AoA, to register products they wanted the safeguard to apply to. Given that few developing countries applied NTBs, and of those that did many chose to nominate their own tariff ceiling rather than undergo tariffication, few could access the SSG.
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Only thirty-nine Members can use the safeguard, of which twenty-two are developing countries. 50 Between 1995 and 2004 only six of the eligible developing countries applied the SSG. 51 In 2003 Action Aid reported that of the 6072 SSG products registered, 68.2 percent (4142) are registered to developed countries, 31.8 percent (1930) to developing country Members. 52 The market access rules simultaneously disarmed developing countries of key tools to respect, protect and fulfill the right to food, while diminishing their already limited access to heavily protected Global North markets. Market access is important to the right to food in the Global South for several reasons. Firstly, the ease of implementing import/export taxes, compared to other revenues sees agriculture highly taxed in developing countries. Tariffs are therefore a principal source of government revenue. Reduction in revenue negatively affects the ability of the State to fulfill the right to food. Secondly, raising tariffs is the main way that developing countries can protect domestic markets from dumping. (Most developing countries were unable to use the SSG to protect local markets). Thirdly, Global South countries could not expand agricultural returns by taking on higher income activities such as food processing, because of a process called tariff escalation. Tariff escalation sees lower tariffs for raw products and higher tariffs for processed goods with higher rates of return. It therefore locks developing countries from important value added markets. Fourthly, access to the lucrative markets in the North was restricted by dirty tariffication, use of the SSG facility and weak rules on TRQs. The problem was further compounded by developed countries using tariff peaks to protect their markets. For example, while achieving average applied tariffs that met, or nearly met their WTO obligations, Japan has held applied tariff peaks on agricultural goods of 609, 634 and 781 percent; Canada 718, 532 and 314 percent; United States 350, 164 and 132 percent, and the European Communities of 205, 233 and 236 percent keeping developing country producers out of export markets for agricultural products such as sugar, cereals, meat and dairy. 53 It is clear that many developing countries violated their obligation to respect, protect and fulfill the right to food in agreeing to the AoA. Discerning the direct results from the AoA, particularly given broader trade liberalization policies, does present a challenge, however we can see that States failed to respect and protect local, particularly small-hold, producers by exposing them to increased dumping. Furthermore, they have not protected the livelihoods of local exporters, the AoA reducing their market access. Dumping and reduced market access have also regressed the State's ability to fulfill -facilitate agriculture-based livelihoods. By reducing their capacity to guarantee the right to food in exchange for future free trade gains, States have violated their obligation to equally address short-, mid-and long-term needs, particularly true of the Peace Clause, where States opted out of a legal mechanism that would protect against dumping.
Although the State agrees to uphold the right to food, in an era of globalized policy-making to what extent do other States, through their own direct actions or participation in international organizations, incur an inter-State responsibility for the right to food? In 2006 the Special Rapporteur described, at minimum, this responsibility as one of respect -in essence to "do no harm." 54 The Special Rapporteur highlighted legal grounds for how WTO Members violate their right to food responsibilities (or third parties under their jurisdiction) if they undermine another State's capacity to defend this right, through for example undue pressure to surrender tools to uphold the right to food, or through programs which lead to dumping. 55 More blatant examples of breeching the "do no harm" principle are evident, with powerful countries ignoring AoA rules altogether. In 2005 the WTO appellate body found that the US illegally hid subsidies that should have been declared under AMS. 56 US subsidies depressed global cotton prices, with the US cotton export price 47 percent below the cost of production, leading to a massive loss of livelihoods and income in the Western African countries of Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Benin as well as other poor countries. 57 In 2007 Oxfam America reported that even a modest increase in world prices (4 -16 percent) by dropping US cotton subsidies, could raise incomes equivalent to feeding one million children for a year in West Africa. 58 The following section assesses how, given these experiences, the right to food in the Global South has featured in the DR negotiations.
HOW HAS THE WTO RESPONDED TO RIGHT TO FOOD CONCERNS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH?
Under the AoA, subsequent negotiations were to take into account the experience of UR AoA implementation: the effects on world trade in agriculture; the experience of implementing reduction commitments; S&D mechanisms; and impacts on NTCs. While free trade offered to simplify trade rules, the complexity of the UR AoA agreement meant it was several years before the full implications were understood, as mostly Global North nations exploited loopholes, seen by the South to violate the spirit of the agreement. Increasing attention and critique of the AoA led to attempts being made to appease the Global South by launching a "development round" at the November 2001 Doha Ministerial meeting -offering to broaden negotiations from a "purely economic perspective" to better consider the NTCs of trade liberalization. The following subsections examine the different AoA negotiation phases and their implications for the right to food.
Articulating the Right to Food: The Lead up to Doha
Running from March 2000 to March 2001, Phase One of negotiations saw 126 of the WTO's then 142 Members submit forty-five proposals and three technical documents, 59 with the Global South determined not to be locked out of negotiations, as occurred in the UR. Proposals highlight a range of shared and specific concerns about the UR AoA's impacts on the capacity of a State to guarantee the right to food. Mauritius and Norway explicitly cited the right to food, although the UN was only in the early stages of articulating this right. 60 Most commonly, developing countries refer to the right to food through direct or indirect reference to production-, trade -, labor-or transferbased entitlements. These are often couched in language such as "development objectives", "food security" or international commitments on world food supplies, such as through the 1996 WFS.
Developing countries emphasized food production as a social safety net in their Phase One and Phase Two (March 2002 to March 2003) proposals. They also raised links between trade and social protection mechanisms such as state trading enterprises, state marketing boards, and the general system of preferences. The need for sufficient policy space to respond to local food needs was also clear, and linkages were drawn between national security, political and economic stability and food policy. 61 A group of small island states wrote that their "diseconomy of scale, diseconomy of scope and high unit costs" prevented their effective participation in international agricultural trade altogether. 62 Food aid disciplines were also debated. An end to the Blue Box, and reform or removal of the Green Box in order to protect local production and livelihoods was a common theme. Cotton and tropical products were also raised, but are beyond the scope of this paper. The SSG was a recurrent topic with proposals advocating to either: stop the SSG; provide access to all Members; or abolish developed country access in favor of developing countries. Proposals discussed expanding S&D provisions, with Global South countries now advocating for specific instruments to protect livelihoods, food security and rural development. (The UR AoA provided S&D through an additional time implementation period or reduced commitments with certain exemptions for LDCs). Tensions among Global South members emerged in debates on whether S&D should apply to all developing countries or smaller sub-sets such as Small Island Developing States. While Global South countries identified similar general areas of concern, the diversity of national, geographic, economic or developmental circumstances led to a wide range of negotiating positions from Member nations and coalitions.
In June 2000, 11 countries presented a proposal for Special and Differential Treatment and a Development Box. 63 The proposal drew on GATT Article XXI which exempts national security issues from trade disciplines, stating food security was essential to national security and political sovereignty. The proposal recommended a Development Box with policy instruments that protect and enhance developing countries' domestic food production capacity, particularly in key staples. It called for increased food security and food accessibility; an additional 10 percent de minimis support for developing countries; mechanisms to address OECD tariff peaks and escalations; abolition of SSG access for developed countries but use by developing countries; and specifically listing the products and sectors to which disciplines would apply. In January 2001 India followed with a proposal for a Food Security Box, calling for flexibility for developing countries in how they provide subsidies for key farm inputs; product-specific support to low income and resource-poor farmers to be excluded from AMS; and an end to the Green Box. 64 The proposal argued for a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) separate to the SSG; developing countries to be exempt from any minimum level of market access; capacity for developing countries to raise low tariff bindings, and the inclusion of various tropical products in AoA product coverage. These papers were seminal in the articulation and structure of the Global South's negotiating position, especially given India's future role in negotiations. Given the strong role played by various Global South coalitions supported by a world-wide campaign on the right to food, the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration stated that:
[S]pecial and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied in the schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated… to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and rural development. 65 In exchange for this wording, developing countries agreed to an expanded negotiation mandate which would extend to the controversial issues of investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation. The next section explores how in the lead up to the Cancún Ministerial meeting developing countries looked to coalitions for support. Such coalitions engender inherent tensions as Members navigate the diverse circumstances and often competing interests of the Global South, incorporating net exporters, NFIDCs, countries with preferential trade agreements linked to EU prices, countries advocating greater protections and greater liberalization, each with a varying current capacity to guarantee the right to food and unique requirements as to how this is best achieved.
Global South Coalitions and the Right to Food: From Doha to Cancún
In 2002 negotiations began, which saw a North-South divide, transatlantic tensions, as well as South-South divisions on the issue of agriculture. Together the EU, Norway, Japan and Switzerland took a very defensive approach to agricultural trade liberalization. They drew support from many African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries dependent on the EU for non-reciprocal preferential market access. The US on the other hand sided with the Cairns group which demanded reform of all the three pillars. A group of developing countries supported the Cairns group on wanting an end to subsidies, but strongly differed in maintaining the right of developing countries to use tariffs to protect food security and livelihoods. 66 In an effort to bridge the various divides, in March 2003, the Chair of Agriculture, Stuart Harbinson, released a paper that outlined draft modalities for negotiations. (In WTO negotiations modalities provide the further details to a framework, such as formulas, for final commitments). Harbinson proposed reform of all three pillars with developing countries able to designate an unspecified number of special products subject to lower cuts. 67 Furthermore, Harbinson called for an end to developed country use of the SSG and the establishment of a new SSM facility for developing countries to protect food security and livelihoods. The Harbison text did not take into account many of the Global South proposals on AoA reform. Harbinson worked within the flawed framework of the AoA and did not propose any structural changes. A prominent NGO, Third World Network, quoting a senior former Indian trade negotiator noted that:
[s]ince 1995, when the AoA was implemented, the many inadequacies and inequities of the agreement have become more apparent. But the Harbinson text followed the same pattern of imbalance, though there were some small positive features in the text which could be made use of. The introduction of 'a strategic product category' [special product category] was important though the treatment to it was "far from adequate."68 Even though the Harbinson text fell far, far short of Global South demands, both the EU and the US rejected it. The EU was not willing to reduce tariffs or eliminate export subsidies, the US was not ready to reduce domestic support and wanted deeper tariff cuts. Given the transatlantic divide, in July 2003 the EU and US agreed to attempt to resolve their differences before the upcoming Cancún Ministerial meeting. 69 A month later in August 2003, the EU and US produced a joint text which aimed to open Global South markets while continuing to protect their own. The text proposed changes to allow the US to increase its trade distorting support under AMS as well as changes to Blue Box rules to permit the US to increase trade distorting support beyond production limiting programs. The proposed changes to the market access pillar were the most audacious in terms of the right to food. According to the text, tariffs would be reduced using a blended formula. 70 The proposal was very carefully crafted to ensure the EU could continue to maintain high tariffs for products of export importance to developing countries (such as sugar and dairy) while also undermining the capacity of many developing countries to protect their own agricultural markets through tariff protection. 71 Rajesh Aggarwal (former trade negotiator for India on the AoA) assessed the formula as "fundamentally and structurally aimed at prying open markets in developing countries." 72 Furthermore, despite the Global South's emphasis on S&D, its pivotal role in defending the right to food and the Doha Declaration commitment to review food security issues, there was little reference to it. Nor did the text address Harbinsons' proposals on special products and safeguards. The joint EU-US text blatantly ignored three years of work by the majority of Membership in trying to craft an agreement. To add insult to injury, the joint text became the basis of the draft Cancún Ministerial Declaration circulated on 31 August 2003. The official negotiating text of the Cancún Ministerial meeting did not represent the views of the vast majority of WTO Members.
With only a few weeks until the 2003 Cancún Ministerial meeting, the deadline for concluding a Doha agreement, Global South Members were incensed at the EU-US stance. In response, a coalition of mainly large Global South agricultural exporters -accounting for one-fifth of global farm exports and including China, India and Brazil, 73 expressed their dissatisfaction by presenting an alternative framework on 4 September 2003. 74 The Group of 20 (G-20), as it became known, called for the WTO to advance a true free trade agenda and its proposal addressed fundamental North-South imbalances in AoA trade liberalization. The framework called for a cap and/or reduction on the Green Box; reduction in developed country de minimis levels; a reduction on all trade-distorting domestic support measures on a product-specific basis; the end to the Blue Box; food aid reform; the use of a blended formula to target high tariff products for the greatest reductions; and an end to the SSG. To protect the right to food, the G-20 advocated for concessions for Special Products to safeguard food security. It demanded a SSM which would enable developing countries to more easily raise tariffs against import surges. Five days later the G-33 (the Alliance for Strategic Products and Special Safeguard Mechanisms), presented a communiqué on its position. The G-33 "[represented] the interests of a majority of the world's small vulnerable resource poor farmers from developing countries across the continents." 75 Led by Indonesia, the G-33 Members sought policy space to manage their obligations to secure food security, arguing that it is a State's prerogative to liberalize only to the extent it can best meet its domestic obligations.
Although the G-20 platform looked to fulfill-facilitate the right to food by expanding market access and the G-33 rallied around a defensive agenda, in large part the two were emphasizing differing aspects of a similar issue -G-33 countries seeking to protect themselves from developed country trade-distortions; G-20 countries hoping to reduce them. 76 At Cancún other negotiating coalitions joined the G-33: the African Union, LDCs and the African Caribbean and Pacific Countries. Together they formed the G-90, becoming the G-100 with the addition of the Small Vulnerable Economies group -representing 80 percent of humanity -although not all WTO Members. 77 At Cancún dissent among Global South Members grew as they were again excluded from closeddoor negotiations.
The growing discord at Cancún was publicized by a worldwide food rights campaign. Campaigners provided an ongoing stream of analysis and advocacy, presenting food sovereignty as a conceptual counter-force to the WTO's "single global economy." 78 While NGOs, UN agencies, the World Bank and the WTO passed figures and statistics back and forth, the food rights campaign presented the human experience of the free trade food security paradigm. It showed the real suffering of people facing hunger and uncertainty, the Special Rapporteur observing only a year earlier on the absence of a human face in discussions of food security. 79 For many food rights campaigners this grief and frustration was epitomized in the public suicide of Korean farmer Lee Kyung Hae outside the Cancún Ministerial. 80 Food rights advocates contend that the creation of the WTO enacted a system of international trade law that runs parallel to rather than integrated with human rights law. 81 The WTO operates a rigorous dispute resolution mechanism and various tools for enforcement, while the human rights structure depends on diplomacy to defend the right to food, giving States the imperative to prioritize trade commitments above human rights. 82 The WTO dispute resolution mechanism is also costly, time-consuming and difficult for many developing countries to access. Some LDCs have attached themselves as third parties to initiate trade dispute cases, but this is rare, with different views whether this is due to fears of possible political repercussions to aid or loans from the Global North or perhaps legal capacity. 83 The first Special Rapporteur described this legal schism in the Bretton Woods system as "a type of schizophrenia." 84 Small-hold farmers in the Global North also point out that far from protecting their livelihoods, government subsidies are largely directed towards transnational companies and large agribusiness -UK sugar company Tate & Lyle receiving US $227 million in direct and indirect export subsidies in a single year. 85 In just five years (1997-2002), over 90,000 small farms in the US were lost, driven out by the deflated prices of overproduction. 86 At Cancún the new Global South coalitions, particularly the G-20, were clear they would not accept the EU-US position as an official ministerial declaration. Talks collapsed. In the following weeks under pressure from the US, several Latin American countries left the G-20, 87 but the coalition survived, and since, membership has been stable. In 2004 negotiations resumed with a revised format, changed from a series of proposals moderated by the chair, to direct meetings of members and coalitions, large and small, to collectively negotiate an agreed text. This was a brief flourishing of democratic engagement with many feeling that the dynamics of negotiations had shifted. States now had the opportunity to advance their specific trade interests and directly represent their particular requirements for safeguarding the right to food. The seeming power of developing countries to set the agenda was summed up on 9 May 2004 when the EU Trade and Agriculture Commissioners wrote a letter to trade ministers proclaiming that LDCs and weak or vulnerable developing countries should have "the round for free", getting better access to developed and advanced developing country markets without having to expand access to their own. 88 They were soon forced to back down. 89 As developing country Members rallied around "No Deal is Better Than a Bad Deal" at Cancún, it appeared the Global South could proffer the political power for a trade agreement in which Members could respect and protect existing food entitlements, while finding avenues to further fulfill this right. Developed countries responded neither by walking their free trade talk nor accepting equal levels of national protections, but by courting the G-20's political powerhouses. 90 In April 2004 five Members formed a negotiating group known as the Five Interested Parties (FIP); the US, EU and Australia (representing the Cairns Group) as well as G-20 representatives Brazil and India (India is also in the G-33). 91 Since August 2004 the FIP has expanded to include Japan (known as the G-6), and China (G-7). In the post-July Framework negotiations, the developing country members of the FIP/G-6/G-7 have usurped broader Global South participation. While China, Brazil and especially India have a large percentage of population engaged in agriculture, they are also industrial economies seeking market access in other areas, therefore willing to make certain trade offs. During the G-6 talks in July 2006, the majority of the membership was left out the negotiations. The Potsdam G-4 talks (2007) exposed Global South tensions when developing countries issued a statement that they would not be bound by decisions in that forum as they had had no part in it. 93 The ongoing exclusion of the G-33 and G-90 leadership from G-7 negotiations, given their active and broad membership, leaves in doubt to what extent the majority position on right to food-related protection is considered in a final text.
Technical Details versus
Despite the strong call for a fundamentally different AoA, post-July Framework proposals have remained primarily focused on technical details. The dynamics of negotiations from July 2004 through to December 2008 are analyzed from a food rights perspective in the sub-sections that follow. 
Domestic support
The July Framework charted the direction of the DR AoA negotiations on domestic support but did not address the imbalanced and flawed domestic support rules and no substantial changes were made except to increase protections for the rich. The G-20's initial proposal advocated for de minimis cuts for developed countries only, however negotiators accepted de minimis reductions for all Members under The July Framework. This would disproportionately affect developing countries, because they have few avenues to provide supports to farmers under AoA rules. By contrast, developed countries can access the Green Box, the Blue Box and AMS. A proviso exempting cuts for developing countries that direct almost all their de minimis support to subsistence and resourcepoor farmers has been introduced to meet food rights concerns. This prevents States from directing supports to best meet and improve their right to food committments in their specific circumstances, locking them into low-income activities if they are to keep the few supports they have. The July Framework also made vague references to "some" reductions in AMS productspecific support. Given that a high percentage of EU and US support is on a handful of products, this could have been a particular boon for Global South exporters. However, this "reduction" has materialized as merely a monetary limit on the total value of product-specific AMS, based on a peak period for this type of support (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . The application of an average product-specific AMS level, rather than product-by-product, allows support to be concentrated on key products.
In a big blow to the right to food, The July Framework approved a change to the Blue Box rules so that payments would not be restricted to production limiting programs. 94 This change would permit the US to move their counter-cyclical subsidies (which are not production limiting) from the Amber Box to the Blue Box. 95 Given the widespread calls for Blue Box eradication or reform, how the expanded Blue Box entered the July Framework is unclear. 96 In Blue Box negotiations the US has pushed, and so far achieved, its own protectionist interests, in blatant disregard of free trade principles. Food rights campaigners spotlight the Blue Box to show how rich countries use "free trade" to pry open the economies of the less powerful, while strengthening their own protections. Furthermore, under the July Framework the Green Box escaped disciplines, despite commitments to ensure it was truly non-or minimally trade distorting. 97 The December text proposed a 70 percent reduction in trade distorting US subsidies from US$ 48 billion to US$ 14.4 billion and an 80 percent cut to EU subsidies from 110 billion euros to 22 billion. 98 However, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) noted that both would "be allowed to maintain billions of dollars of green box subsidies…with no cap or reduction commitments on this category of payments."
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Export Competition
After protracted negotiations, it was agreed under the July Framework that export subsidies would be eliminated. The due date for the elimination of export subsidies is 2013 (agreed during the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting). However this was not a big win for the Global South in terms of the right to food because the export competition pillar houses a very small proportion of trade distorting export subsidies. The Centre for Trade and Development (CENTAD) notes that only 3.6 percent of the EU's export subsidies are reported under the Export Competition pillar of the AoA. 100 Similarly, the Africa Trade Network (which coordinates the activities of African NGOs) noted in 2005 that eliminating export subsidies "loses in significance when compared to the damages to African farmers caused by domestic support measures in the rich countries. The domestic support in the EU amounts to 55 billion euros, while export subsidies amount to 3 billion euros." 101 On the contentious issue of food aid, the post-July Framework talks have fallen short in safeguarding the right to food. The July Framework, made a vague commitment to addressing food aid, and the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration agreed to "effective disciplines on in-kind food aid, monetization [where recipients can sell food for cash] and re-exports so that there can be no loophole for continuing export subsidization."
102 While many developed countries have voluntarily made substantial reforms on food aid (outside the WTO), the US has been resistant to reforms; food dumping in the guise of aid being a long-standing US policy since the 1950s. 103 In 2002, 60 percent of US food aid was monetized, food aid merely a cumbersome way for poor governments to generate cash 104 Monetization, a back-door subsidy because it leads to more donor products sold in local markets, exploits the vulnerabilities of cash-strapped food importers -evident in the LDC coalition pressing for continuing monetized food aid.
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Monetized food aid continues to LDCs and NFIDCs, which would hamper these States from meeting their respect obligations to local producers and their fulfil-provide commitments. This balance is best achieved through cashbased food aid in grant form, allowing recipient States to control food purchasing. 106 Food aid provisions allow for a "minimal" level of commercial displacement, rather than eliminating it all together.
Market Access
In negotiations leading up to the July Framework, India pressed for a tiered formula for tariff reductions which could address tariff peaks and minimize the concentrated product support of the US and EU. 107 Reluctantly, the US and the EU abandoned the unpopular blended formula, and the July Framework adopted a tiered formula. However, exactly how tariffs in each tier would be reduced was undecided. A single line in the July Framework was devoted to reducing tariff escalation through an agreed formula and commitments to negotiate Special Products, the SSG and an SSM were vague. For G-33 Members, the SSM is an important safety net enabling countries to respect the right to food by offering a level of protection for local producers from dumping. Although under the UR AoA Members can enact countervailing duties against import surges, the analytical standards for proving causlity in the WTO are so high that few Members are bold enough to enact such safeguards. 108 The G33 proposes that the SSM should easily allow developing countries to raise tariffs in response to import surges. Despite the Global South's emphasis on the SSM it was afforded a single sentence in the July Framework, with no substantive description. Unfortunately, the quid pro quo was accepting a last minute proposal for Sensitive Products (separate from Special Products) which would allow rich countries continued protection of certain products shielded by high tariffs. The EU introduced Sensitive Products as a compromise for accepting a tiered formula.
The tiered formula applies only to bound, not applied rates, tiered reductions however would not apply to all tariff lines -Sensitive Products incur a much smaller tariff reduction (in return for expanding markets by increasing in-quota TRQs). 109 Under the December 2008 text, Sensitive Products are self-designated, with no requirement to meet any food security or other criteria, and available to all Members. Developed countries can designate up to 4 percent of tariff lines as Sensitive Products. Members with more than 30 percent of their tariffs in the highest tier can increase their number of Sensitive Products by an additional 2 percent, subject to certain conditions. 110 According to CENTAD, 4 percent of tariff lines will be enough to protect developed country interests given the very narrow range of products they protect. 111 To add insult to injury, Members are not required to follow tariff escalation reforms on products they list as Sensitive Products.
112 Developing Members can access a third more sensitive products than developed countries. Developed country Sensitive Products protections could negatively affect market access for agricultural products from the Global South. 113 Sensitive Products is representative of the success of key Global North negotiators in shifting human rights concerns towards technical issues, and then negotiating on technicalities far removed from the right to food concerns initially expressed. This is just another tool with which to block Global South exports.
Substantial negotiations on Special Products and the SSM, key elements of the Global South agenda, have been left until last. The July 2008 proposal for Special Products allows developing countries to retain their present level of tariffs, or make a lower level of reductions, on a specific group of products. These would be self-designated based on food security or rural development needs, and need to meet certain food security indicators. 114 Developed countries conceded to G-33 demands for Special Products only after securing a draft text that protects the status quo in global agricultural trade. In July 2008 the Membership was close to agreement on Special Products, where 5 percent of tariff lines face no cuts. Given developed countries megatariffs, Sensitive Products and domestic supports, this is a modest achievement. Agreement on Special Products at this stage could have made it difficult for developing country coalitions to reject the July 2008 text despite the implications of the broader text for Members' ability to guarantee the right to food.
Such concessions are permitted only to the extent that they do not conflict with the broader agenda of a select group of powerful Members, apparent in talks on the SSM. Throughout the post-UR negotiations a key Global South demand has been restricting special safeguards to developing countries only. However, while the July 2008 Ministerial meeting opened negotiations on the SSM, it did not eliminate the SSG. The December 2008 text finally drew some boundaries, proposing that developed countries reduce the SSG to 1 percent of scheduled tariff lines, with almost eight years to cut SSG use altogether. 115 This gives developed countries (and a small number of developing countries) the right to protect a narrow range of highly protected products for another seven years.
Under the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration the SSM was to contain both a price and volume trigger, 116 the G-33 advocating that the SSM should exceed, rather than match, the SSG. The proposed SSM is time-constrained, so does not permit action against import surges for their full duration. The G-33 has highlighted that the SSM, to be effective must be easy to activate, but is becoming increasingly complex. In 2006 FAO analyzed import surges between 1980 and 2003, comparing the UR SSG method with the then proposed SSM. It found a 70 percent increase in actions applying the SSG compared to the SSM price trigger (from 7,000 to 12,000). 117 The proposed SSM in the July 2008 text fell short of the SSG on triggers, number of tariff lines on which it can apply and permitted response. The July 2008 Mini-Ministerial fixated on the volume trigger after which Members could impose tariffs above their bound rates. On July 25, WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy presented the G-7 with the possibility of raising tariffs above bound rates when imports were 40 percent above those in the reference period. 118 The Lamy proposal required demonstrable harm to food security, livelihoods and rural development before the SSM could kick in, which undermines the role of the SSM to respect and protect against harm in the first place. Under this proposal developing countries would have to wait for imports to be more than a third higher than normal before taking action to offset subsidies. Even then they would be constrained on how high above bound rates they could raise tariffs, rather than matching the surge. Talks soon after met an impasse, with Agriculture Chair Crawford Falconer describing the SSM as less a technical, than a "political divide." 119 This, despite the G-33 already straying so far from demands that countries be able to safeguard the right to food by combating all import surges.
The December 2008 text tinkers around the edges of a very flawed July 2008 text and continues to ignore the contribution of the bulk of Global South Members, their citizens and civil society. For all the free trade talk, the AoA shows that global markets in agriculture are intensely distorted to meet the interests of those with power. It is morally deplorable that the WTO was not stopped from doing this in 1995. In the midst of a global food crisis, where 1 in 7 humans on the planet lives in hunger, where they face what the former Special Rapporteur described as the "unbearable nagging dread that tortures undernourished persons from the moment they wake up", it is outrageous there was an impasse in the WTO negotiations over such issues as whether Global South countries can take minimum measures to protect staple foods and livelihoods.
120
CONCLUSION
This article has argued that the AoA established a set of rules which are biased against developing countries, constraining the State from acting to respect, protect and fulfill the right to food. The WTO's AoA is not just a trade agreement, it is a set of rules which undergird a deeply unfair system that imposes a free trade model on the poor and carves out protection for the richest players in the global market, blatantly violating the right to food. The AoA sanctions a global system which denies agricultural market access to the Global South. It legitimizes and promotes increased agribusiness dumping, depressing world market prices and violating the right to food, and curtails the right of developing countries to mitigate the effects of dumping in local markets through the use of tariffs. In the post-UR negotiations on agriculture, developing countries have clearly articulated their need for an AoA congruent with their right to food responsibilities, supported by a worldwide food rights campaign. Instead of responding to the legitimate needs of all Member States to meet their right to food obligations, the developed world invited a small group of middle-income powers into its folds, pursuing "divide and rule" tactics while claiming to engage the Global South. The human rights agenda was then severely compromised when India and Brazil, as members of the FIP, agreed to the July 2004 Framework. The July 2004 Framework marked a turning point in the DR negotiations by creating a schism in the Global South, with a few countries taking a lead in the negotiations leaving out the rest of the developing world. The call for a new kind of AoA went largely unheard in the WTO after the July Framework. For examples of countries incorporating food sovereignty into national laws see SWAC/OECD, supra note 10, at 31-32. The Special Rapporteur also recommends food sovereignty be considered an alternative model for agriculture and agricultural trade in order to guarantee the right to food given the shortfalls of the current trade system. See Special Rapporteur, supra note 18.
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For a concise summary of these theorems see FAO, supra note 10, at 13 -16. 23 FAO, supra note 10, at [13] [14] [15] 40-47 (1995) . 47 Developed countries were to reduce their average bound tariffs by 36 percent over six years, developing countries by 24 percent over ten years and LDCs to bind their tariffs, without reductions. The minimum cut for each product was 15 percent (developed countries) or 10 percent (developing countries).
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